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Abstract: Making use of fieldwork and 25 open-ended interviews with
Tea Party organizers in the state of Illinois, I argue that Tea Party
organizers draw from a continuum of knowledge, combining personal
knowledge and experience with a conservative corporate media and
Tea Party network frame. I draw upon the work of Weber to show how
this continuum connects to various types of rational social action.
Widening this scope of analysis allows not only for a more complex
analysis of how corporate interests are connected to the grass roots
movement, but also how the core frames of the movement are located
throughout our mainstream political and ideological system.
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“Okay," began Bob, a white retiree wearing a farm company hat, as he
read aloud a passage he had written about his awakening to Tea Party
politics:
"We started to wake up when we finally realized that George
W. Bush's compassionate conservatism was really a creeping
drift towards socialism. We were jolted awake when Bush's
snail's pace became Obama's all out sprint, and our President
surrounded himself with far left ideologues socialists, and even
self-described communists.”
He looked at me plainly, as if to ask, "Any questions?". So goes many
of my conversations with Tea Party members in the state of Illinois,
where I interviewed organizers about what brings them to the
movement and how it speaks to issues of concern in their lives. They
frequently discuss socialism, fear about rising national debt, and the

resentment that they feel in having to pay, in their view and via their
taxes, for a bloated political machine and those that they feel are living
off their dollar. Their mix of partial truths and racially coded myths
motivates their political action, which is based upon and also reso nates
with the national discourse around race and individualism. But it is not
only fear and loathing that drives Tea Party action. Organizers also
draw upon intensely personal experiences such as health scares,
financial struggles, and a decline in their local communities to inform
their work.
I designed my study to allow Tea Party members to tell me in extended
conversation why they joined the movement and how the Tea Party
resonates with their lives. I find it true that residents are partially
motivated by baseless fears and racially loaded loathing, which is the
point at which most prior analyses have stopped. However, it is critical
to understand that real issues in their lives, about which they know a
great deal, also motivate the Tea Party organizers working in this state.
While fear-based rhetoric and imagery of the movement certainly
resonates deeply with them, as the analysis below will make clear, it is
not only emotions or their character structure (Langman, 2012;
Lundskow, 2012) that motivate their participation in the movement.
They are also, and indeed always, acting in reasonable-seeming
response to genuine concerns in ways that come to make sense to them,
given the social structure in which they are embedded. Tea Party
organizers are studying the constitution, learning about history and
politics, and working very practically to enact the kinds of changes that
they want to see in their local communities. While racially coded and
myth-infused beliefs are certainly activated, they are also frustra ted
with declining local and personal wealth, corporate welfare, political
disenfranchisement, and seemingly insurmountable national and state
deficits. Missing one half of their motivations shallows our analysis of
the Tea Party, and our ability to resist their politics.
THE PARADOX OF IRRATIONAL RATIONALITY
Depending on a binary framework around rationality also denies the
very real social forces that shape both their movement and our shared
social world. McVeigh's research on organized racism states, "i t is
reasonable to assume that social movement participants are at least as
rational as the people who study them" (2004:905). After all, we are
all—scholars and political lay folk alike -embedded in a shared social
system, and while we may consume different media, many of the
frames of individualism, racism, and a version of history that
legitimates the status quo are often shared. To argue that the Tea Party
members are solely irrational misses the ways in which ideology
operates more broadly, and the social structures that are intimately

connected to it. It also eclipses an understanding of the continuum of
knowledge from which participants draw to motivate and sustain their
involvement in the movement and in their communities.
Weber's four basic structures relating rationalities to social action are
useful here. Instrumentally rational actions are those most colloquial
understood as "rational", involving the use of consciously pursued and
calculable actions. Those who have studied the Tea Party have large ly
employed this conception of rationality to demonstrate the seeming
irrational basis on which Tea Party members act—against their class
interests, or inconsistently around notions of government intervention
(opposing big government but asking the government to intervene to
prevent gay marriage, for example). Value-rational action is
"determined by the belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical,
aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its
prospects for success" ([1922] 1978:25). Some have characterized the
Tea Party as acting primarily out of this rationality schema, as a result
of nihilistic tendencies (Langman, 2012) and authoritarian character
structures (Lundskow, 2012), thereby further coding the actors as
irrational. The following two types of rationality are affectual action,
which Weber notes as "(especially emotional)" (Weber, [1922]
1978:25), determined by an individual's feeling states; and traditional
action, which is essentially action out of habit. Some of the same
scholars who have emphasized value-rational action have also paid
attention to affectual action, often by conflating them into their
"irrational" or false-rationality schemas. Eclipsing instrumental action,
most previous scholarship insists, Tea Party members rely exclusively
on irrational motivations. Instead, I argue that multiple rationalities
are at play, not all of them illogical.
This is not to say that feelings, for example, are always strictly
"rational", nor that they have no role to play in social action. Tea
Party members experience their own hard work and their own
financial pinch, and are apparently willing to believe what a skewed
media system tells them in order to analyze it. As Beck (2000) has
indicated, it is sufficient for a group to simply feel it is losing power
in order to act to regain that power. Indeed, such motivations have
been key to conservative organizing in the United States for decades:
"Conservative movements in the United States construct their
social problem claims by invoking a virtuous American past
inhabited by self-sufficient citizens; they present that past as
under siege by big government and immigrants, portrayed as
threats to the moral fabric of American society. By constructing
a particular collective memory, they evoke emotions such as
moral indignation and fear to highlight the threat to what they

perceive as core national beliefs and values." (Lio, Melzer, &
Reese, 2008:23)
This allows conservative movement members to act on the basis of a
feeling, but it is a feeling that is also informed selectively by facts, myths,
storylines, and other elements of the social structure. A dichotomous
analysis obscures these links in the social structure.
I believe that all but the traditional (habitual) forms of social action are
present along the continuum of knowledge I present in this paper.
Table 1: Tea Party Rationalities as Ideal Types

Weberian Rational Action

Tea Party Expressions

Instrumental

Economic concerns including those
concerning deficit spending

Value-Rational

Opposition to welfare, immigration;
concerns about national security

Affectual

Emotional ties to family, health,
community, nation

Traditional

Not present

Further, these ideal types are situated along a continuum, not existing
distinct from one another.
Conceptualizing a continuum rather than a dichotomy or even Weber's
strict ideal types allows for greater complexity and deeper
understanding of the Tea Party than previous scholarship has provided.
Instrumental reason and action are found when the organizer is basing
his or her participation on personal, tangible fears about their
individual lives and communities. Value-rational action is found at the
other end where a lack of personal experience with racial Others
activates loathing and social action. Affectual action is found
throughout, but is heightened along the middle of the continuum, where
the political issues are understood on a deeply personal level,
particularly around health, children and grandchildren, and their own
hard work.

Figure 1: Tea Party Rationalities along the Continuum of Knowledge

Weber on Rationality
Fear: The Personal is Political
Instrumental

Affectual

Fear: The Political is
Personal
Loathing

Value Rational

TEA PARTY RACISM IS AMERICAN RACISM
This conceptualization of Tea Party interests and actions also help us
deepen our understanding of the racism that is mobilized within the
movement. A multi-state survey of racial attitudes indicates that, "even
as we account for conservatism and partisanship, support for the Tea
Party remains a valid predictor of racial resentment" (Parker, 2010).
Further, " ... support for the Tea Party makes one 25 percent more
likely to be racially resentful than those who don't support the Tea
Party" (Parker, 2010). While that may be true, their reliance on racial
codes, racial stereotypes, and color-blind ideologies in their discourse
is not fundamentally different than that of the mainstream in the
United States. Such an analysis falls into its own false dichotomy
between those who have racism and those who do not, a
conceptualization long discarded by race scholars (Bonilla-Silva,
1997). To emphasize the banality of the racism within the Tea Party
does not pardon or sympathize with it. Tracing the racism infused
throughout the Tea Party is a critical task, one I undertake specifically
in the section on loathing. However, to say that the Tea Party is the
sole or even the most active location of volatile racists misses both the
complexity of their views and, critically, the more pervasive color -

blind racism that is seeped into national politics throughout the
political spectrum. To that end, Tea Party racism is simply American
racism. This recognition, together with the continuum of rationalities
that I propose here, will not allow an easy dichotomy of rational or
irrational people, racists or non-racists.
Thus while it is tempting to dichotomize the Tea Party or other
movements on the far right as somehow fundamentally different than the
mainstream or the scholars who study them, we must resist that urge. As
Blee also notes, "to understand the appeal of history's most abhorrent
movements, researchers need to account for the similarities of these to
mainstream motivations and agendas." (2006:481) McVeigh has made a
similar point, drawing on Schwartz's study of the Southern Farmers'
Alliance: "Rather than assuming, without supporting evidence, that they
are acting irrationally, Schwartz argued that it is more analytically
useful to recognize that individuals make decisions based on incomplete
information." (2004:905). Doing so allows us to analyze the social
system and the social forces that shape these movements, and in which
these movements are embedded.
Fundamentally, in the Tea Party I find a coexistence of rationality and
myth, racism and a struggle to contend with contemporary economic
and social challenges. Based on what members "know" from personal
experience or narrow media exposure, an expression of "structured
ignorance" (McVeigh, 2004), Tea Party members are acting with the
intent to shape and improve their worlds and their country. Most are
well-intentioned people genuinely fearful about our economic and
national security, feeling disenfranchised and disempowered by a
political system that has seemingly left "we the people" behind. Their
involvement in the movement is both a form of political empowerment
and an insistence on democracy.
That does not mean that it is not also fueled by far -right ideology,
racism, and a deeply selective use of quality information. However,
following Hardisty, "... if we focus exclusively on such vitriol, we will
miss the issues raised by the New Right that we need to examine and
address with as much attention as we give to grievances of other
groups in society" (1999:42). To understand the Tea Party, and indeed
to resist it, we must capture the whole of movement members' views
and motivations. Missing this complexity misses the common
ground—a desire for democracy and a secure economic future—that is
shared across the political spectrum.

METHODS
The scholarly study of the right is laden with challenges and
complexities, both theoretically and epistemologically. Issues of access,
trust, and objectivity often receive far less scrutiny when we study
those with whom we share political or identity-based affiliations, a
problem which has plagued much of social movement theory,
especially in its early years. As Blee notes, "The circumscribed
template of modem social movements may be why, until recently,
research on racist movements rarely used the analytic frameworks of
social movement studies. Instead, these generally were explained as
aggregations of individual pathologies of racial hatred, prejudice, and
displaced anger, long after such explanations lost favor in other social
movement arenas"(2006:480). This has meant that many studies of the
far right are conducted from a distance, in what has been called an
"externalist" trend (Goodwin, 2006), meaning that they examine the
larger social, political, and economic forces that drive the movement
nationally, rather than studying the internal dynamics of the movement
or its members directly.
While externalist studies can provide a critical piece of the analysis,
telling us about the theories of social psychology and the larger socio economic forces that shape these movements, it is also necessary to
examine the motivations and views of people that are directly involved
in producing the movement. As Blee notes, "... without differentiating
the external façade of the far right from its internal dynamics it is easy
to assume that the public proclamations of its spokespersons are
mirrored in the motivations of its activists and the actions of its groups"
(2007:122). Much research and reporting on conservative movements,
indeed, proves otherwise. Hardisty, who has completed extensive
fieldwork on the contemporary right, writes: "The best analysis captures
the complexity of the right's ideology, agenda, and methods.... In trying to
understand the right, there is no substitute for being there" (1999:6).
Being there with the 25 people I've interviewed and in my fieldwork
settings has allowed for a depth of analysis, and room for contradiction
and complexity, that is often obscured at a distance.
For this paper, I conducted 25 in-person interviews with Tea Party
organizers in the state of Illinois. Interviews typically lasted about an
hour, but ranged from 40 minutes to over three hours. Therein, I asked
open-ended questions about what motivates and sustains involvement
in the movement, and concrete details about participants' personal
involvement. Interviews were transcribed and coded with respect to
topics of discussion such as welfare, immigration, the Constitution, free
markets, children, Republicans, liberals; and themes within those topics
such as fear, generations, patriotism, gender, race, trust, etc.

I also supplemented my interviews with field observations when
possible, attending campaign trainings and Tea Party conventions in
the state; the former was attended by 60-70 Tea Party members and the
latter more than 1000. I took extensive field notes from those events,
where I paid particular attention to the stories told by organizers, the
side banter around campaign-related strategy, and informal
conversations with Tea Party members at the events, where I offered
that I was there simply to listen and learn. The organizers of these
events knew my research interests, and the events were otherwise paid
and open to the public.
All of the participants in my study are white. Although I've heard buzz
about black and Latino/a members of the Tea Party coming to protests
and rallies, I have yet to find or be introduced to any people of color
inside the movement. If they are present, they were not actively
involved in any of the local chapters that I was able to access, nor were
they connected to the organizers I met throughout the state. At the large
500+ person Tea Party convention I saw perhaps a dozen people of
color; I did not get an opportunity to interview them. I also interviewed
more women than men by a ratio of 3 to 2. Participants indicate that
women are slightly more involved in their local chapters than men, a
matter which some attribute to time and ability and others to passion and
talent. Although I am developing a separate paper on the gender
dynamics of the movement, it is critical to note that the movement is
gendered in important ways, some of which will be highlighted here.
I did not collect formal demographic information from participants,
but most are either self-employed, retired, or have otherwise
flexible work schedules. This certainly is common among organizers
of any political persuasion. But between that and discussion of
indicators like homes, retirement, gifts of homes and schooling to
children, inheritance, savings, vacations, and other financial measures, I
assert that the majority of participants I interviewed are middle class and
above. Certainly all are middle aged and above. The youngest members
I've met are in their mid-40s, with most in their mid-late 50s or their
60s. They are rural or suburban; only one member was living in a large
city at the time of their involvement with the Tea Party, but this person
was not active in her city but rather with groups in a nearby suburb. As
such, given U.S. residential patterns, most are likely living in
communities with people of their same race and social class. This is key
to understand given my argument below about the continuum of
knowledge that motivates and legitimates members' involvement in the
party. It also builds a strong relationship to the prior literature on
conservative and right-wing movements, as the demographic
characteristics of those eras' supporters are identical to that of the Tea
Party (McGirr, 2001).

THE CONTINUUM OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE RACIALIZED SOCIAL
SYSTEM
The analysis presented from here forward demonstrates a move along
the continuum of knowledge presented in Figure 1, beginning with
personal knowledge and individual realities, the place of instrumentally
rational action. This continuum moves from one of fear, where very real
individual and family problems are being discussed, to a value -rational
loathing, where the fears are informed less by personal experience than
by the conservative corporate media and Tea Party networks.
Significantly, it is in the loathing where racial fears and resentments are
most strongly mobilized, as pervasive racism and segregation keep th at
personal experience at bay. Examining this continuum, and these
rationalities in their social context, helps us analyze the broader
racialized social system, driven by corporate conservative media, in
which we are all embedded. While this paper, in the interest of space,
does not include examples from the middle of the continuum, detailing
the difference at each end begins to reveal its presence.
Fear
The fear end of the continuum is directly relevant to, and stemming
primarily from, organizers' personal lives. The concerns expressed in
this section are in no sense irrational. People are worried about job
security, the ability to retire, and the viability of small businesses. The
following passage comes from my field notes, during the first session
at a daylong conservative campaign training led by a national
organization. The trainer, Amy, began the session, titled, "Way to
Getting Involved (sic)", with the idea of becoming a better citizen
activist.
She asked what the important issues were for conservatives/
Tea Party members. One man quickly and loudly stated,
"JOBS." Amy said, "Jobs, OK, what else? How about taxes?"
Taxes got affirmation from 5-6 of 50+ people in the room.
Someone said "business double tax", which Amy affirmed as
"Good". Someone mentioned state budgets, and the comment
was made that maybe it was good that CA may declare
bankruptcy. Someone else said, "Can't retire". (field notes)
There are two important things to notice about this passage. The first is
that the concerns raised by a room full of Tea Party organizers from
around the state were centered around very real economic problems:
jobs, taxes for small businesses, and retirements. These are concerns
that have a strong basis in organizers' everyday lives, and which are

affecting their families and communities in tangible ways. The second is
that despite the national organizer's attempt to prod organizers to rant
about taxes, they remained focused on those key objectives. In fact, after
this happened, she continued to try to refocus them into more mainline
conservative politics: "Amy then turned discussion to the question as to
whether conservatives are listened to in Chicago. It was at this point that
she polled about whether or not being conservative made them a
minority in their community; 3-4 said yes but it seemed Amy expected
more to say yes." Clearly Tea Party organizers are not only taking
marching orders from corporate interests and ideologues at the top. They
are driven by the genuine interests and experiences of Tea Party
members themselves.
This is well exemplified by the following passage from my interview
with Barb and her husband Chad, who work together to organize in their
rural community:
BARB: But, you know, it can be difficult for those that have
already retired. But there's going to be people who can't even
think about retiring, who wanted to retire.... Look at the
percentage of people that cannot find work, and the
unemployment rate. And that doesn't even include those who
quit looking a long time ago. People have been looking for two
years.
CHAD: If you go into, oh, you go into McDonald's, you can
go in any of the Home Depots or Walmarts, you see these
really old folks working, and they're working because they
need to supplement their income.
BARB: It's heartbreaking.
This segment of my interview with Barb and Chad could have taken
place at dinner tables around the country, regardless of political
persuasion. They are talking about things that they see in their
community, be it on a visit to the big chains or, as they also discussed,
in a conversation at the local café about who is working and who is
having trouble. Their heart is broken by these conditions, and their fear
about their community and the security of their own retirement is both
real and rational. Following Weber, it is "determined by expectations as
to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human
beings" ([1922] 1978:24). Certainly it would be ideal if they could see
the connection between the Wal-Mart and the boarded up local business
on main street, but their inability to do so is embedded in our social
system, rather than, as other research has theorized, their pathologies.
The same is true even in standard conservative discussions about taxes. I
asked Pamela, as a way of closing down our interview, if there was

anything else she thought someone studying the Tea Party should know.
She answered,
I guess if I had a ten second moment with somebody, I guess it
would be the fact that don't you realize that inflation is a tax
increase. We can't afford it. I mean, individually I am not
going to be able to afford it. My salary doesn't go up. If they
keep inflating the dollar, that's a tax increase, and I can't afford
it. And I'm getting close to retirement. And perhaps that's what
all of us worry, why it tends to be a little more the older sector
in the Tea Party. But maybe that's why, because we all realize
once we're on a fixed income, we're in trouble.
Is Pamela's analysis of inflation driven by conservative media and
politics? Most likely it is, given that she, like most participants I
interviewed, relied exclusively on those sources of information. But
that analysis is calculable and rational to her because it speaks directly
to her real life: her salary, her budget, and her ability to retire. She
also provides a key insight into what she believes motivates Tea Party
organizers: as they near retirement those realities are increasingly
challenging difficult to manage.
The concerns expressed above are echoed by the vast majority of Tea
Party organizers whom I've interviewed thus far. These specific
concerns —about jobs, retirement, pensions, and governmental budgetsare fueled by personal experience. They are forms of instrumental
reason that are coherent with their value-rational politics. As the
following sections will reveal, there are certainly times when
instrumental reason is abandoned and value-rationality or affectual
rationality are instead activated. Their knowledge base may be filtered
through a conservative lens with the goal of advancing corporate
interests that may harm their lives in the end, making their pursuits
"irrational" in the Marxist sense. Despite that, their knowledge base is
intimately real, personal, and quite often rational.
Loathing
The other hand of the continuum is what I call loathing, specifically
because it is most distant from personal experience and knowledge, and
instead fed most strongly by mechanisms in the wider social system.
Significantly, this social system is a racialized one, " ... in which
economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured
by the placement of actors in racial categories or races" (Bonilla -Silva,
1997:469). While race is not the exclusive terrain of this distant
loathing, the ongoing segregation of American society makes
"knowledge" around race something we typically do not gain from

firsthand experience. Studies continue to reveal the pervasiveness of
American segregation, citing the workplace as the most likely place
where most Americans will cross the color line in their everyday
experiences (Ellis & Wright, 2004). It is worth repeating, then, that most
of the organizers that I am meeting in Illinois are retired or small
business owners living in segregated suburban or rural communities,
who are likely to have little to no personal, regular contact with people
of color at home or at work. Further, as Bonilla-Silva (2003) has shown,
this contemporary form of racial ideology often takes on abstracted,
rational-seeming legitimations, removing most action from the sphere of
affectual rationality. This makes them ripe recipients of the racial
project advanced by the conservative media and "grapevine", and
particularly subject to value-rationality over instrumental rationality.
The reliance on the conservative "grapevine" is evident in Jim's discussion
of welfare, below.
I believe in welfare when our people need it, those that truly
can't work.... But just like an email I got the other day. This
lady says my grandma told me I'm the breadwinner for the
family. She's in her early 20s. She's on her tenth pregnancy.
She's been pregnant basically every time she was eligible,
from her early teens. And what they did, this particular
family, and I'm sure it's played out millions of times, she is
having all these babies and claims that she can't take care of
them, which everyone agrees, so she hands them over to
DCFS, and then the grandmother says, well, I'll be foster
parent. So then the grandma gets these kids, so they all are
staying in the same house. And I forget how many tho usands
of dollars per child, and she's making a lot better living than I
am doing absolutely nothing but making babies. That's just
wrong....
After the interview, Jim sent me the email he was talking about, which a
quick internet search revealed to have been in e-circulation since at least
2000. It contained a large, color photograph of a young black woman
surrounded by nine healthy-looking black children. The mythic nature of
the welfare queen, who seems reborn yet again for this political moment,
has long been documented, and its racialized nature is quite clear (see
Quadagno 1994). sit there for the rest of their lives and get money from
me. And that's not, in my opinion, what it was intended to do.
The welfare queen and associated myths are as pervasive today as when
they first emerged as a journalistic racial appropriation of Myrdal's
under-class term in 1964 (Gans, 1995). They are pervasive in the
mainstream media and tap value-rationality in most Americans who

share these "ethical, aesthetic, [or] religious" values (Weber, [1922]
1978:25). Yet it is the conservative media and grapevine that pushes the
deepest and most unfounded of these myths, particularly because they
most actively tap value-rationality in their viewers. Several recent polls
and studies have shown FOX News Viewers to be consistently
misinformed and more reliant on trust than scrutiny of their chosen news
source.
The discourse around immigration espoused by many Tea Party organizers
is just as myth-driven, racially loaded, and value-rational. Patty had been
describing her vision for the future of this country and her desire to return to
the ethic of individualism when she said,
And we've always been a melting pot—people who saw us as
the shining city on a hill and wanted to come and they came
legally, and they were required to show that they could
support themselves. I want us to go back to that so that people
who come here do not go on the welfare rolls and they are
here for the right reason. They want to bring up their kids to
be strong individuals and provide for themselves. And they
could set the world on fire if they were allowed to, if they
were free to do what they dreamed of without any rules and
regulations.
Here Patty embodies the essence of what Bonilla-Silva (2003) has
called the "abstract liberalism" frame. This frame, central to color-blind
racism's discourse, is specifically rational, as it takes reasonable-seeming
ideas like Patty's discussion of the melting pot and her selective version of
American immigration history and follows logical-seeming steps to
conclusions that work to uphold the racialized social system. In fact, such
"logic" depends on the very myths about history that her discourse
employs: "Conservative groups actively construct the past in ways that
lament the impending or actual loss of what they believe to be fundamental
American values, namely, individual responsibility and freedom, embodied
by white and male historical figures" (Lio, Melzer, & Reese, 2008:14).
This is the essence of value-rationality. It is critical to note that the
assumed and yet unstated races of who came legally and those who "go on
the welfare rolls and they are here for the right reason" are quite clear, as is
the history of tremendous welfare programs that helped those same white
male historical figures. This coded discourse is critical for both upholding
color-blind racism and its often sympathetic-seeming nature (see BonillaSilva, 2003).
However, not all of that discourse presents a reasonable-seeming and
sympathetic front. The loathing nature of Betty's answer to why she gets
involved in causes in the Southwest despite believing that local people

should control their own fate makes this quite clear:
AUTHOR: I guess I just wonder what motivates you to get
involved outside of your own home state?
BETTY: Because it's my country and I don't want my country
full of illegal people that are here possibly to harm my country
for my grandkids and my kids.... But I hate to see these people
get into our country ... number one, they're getting into our
country, they're not adding anything. They're earning money,
they're sending it back to Mexico. They're sucking off of our
system.
They're basically closing a lot of our hospitals along the
borders because they're [clogging] in there with their
abdominal diseases and their health problems, having their
babies. We're paying for that. Because the doctors don't do it
for free. So our government is evidently paying to have this
done. So what that does is it weakens our system. It also
compromises the people who came in here legally and learned
the language and took the tests and got their citizenship,
which is a very honorable, respected thing.
While the loathing aspect of her remarks is quite clear, notice that she
also guesses about some of the impact of this population: "...So our
government is evidently paying to have this done". This demonstrates
the distance at which she imagines, rather than knows, this raciallyloaded issue. I should point out that Betty, along with one other
woman roughly her age, were the most overtly racist that I
interviewed. But the point is not to label Tea Party activists as racist.
First, most are not nearly as overt as Betty. Further, as my analysis of
the welfare discourse in part makes clear, I am seeing no clear data to
indicate that the discourse and core racial ideology employed by Tea
Party activists is located outside the mainstream US racial discourse.
To that end, Tea Party racism is American racism. What is much more
revealing and critical to appreciate is how that mainstream discourse
and racism can be mobilized by people whose real lives seem touched
by otherwise distant threats, like welfare recipients and immigrants,
fueled by the racial projects of the conservative media and
"grapevine". After all, as Blee has noted in her review of scholarship
around right wing extremism, "Such groups need to convince recruits
that extremist, even bizarre, ideas are valid and that a movement
around these ideas is feasible.... Cultural practices are essential in this
process, by creating bonds among members and normalizing the ideas
and actions of the far right" (2007:124).
The facts of the matter, from a social system and ideological
perspective, are beside the point. Organizers are fueled clearly not by

facts but rather what they feel that they know.
This is, in my view, why the myth of Obama's socialism also seems to
resonate so strongly with organizers. Paula's passage, below, is just one
succinct version of this common theme in my data:
They're overstepping constitutionality and they are inflicting
all of their social standards on all of us. And not only do they
want to control all of us and everything we eat, everything we
do, everything we don't do, but they want us to have our
standard of living lowered for the first time in American
history, where our children and our grandchildren will not have
the same standard of life or expectations of a future ever again,
because everything—when everybody is the same, you bring
everybody down to a much lower level.
To Paula, this makes good sound sense, even if it is not based in reality.
"However muddled and contradictory the content of right wing ideology
appeared to its liberal and left-wing critics, and however difficult to
understand –particularly in its more apocalyptic and conspiratorial
forms—right-wing ideology did evoke a distinctive worldview that
provided a message of real meaning to its adherents" (McGirr,
1999:148). Failing to pay attention to the value-rational and
instrumental meanings embedded in Tea Party organizers' politics, and
the continuum of knowledge from which they draw, limits our
understanding of the movement and our ability to address it.

LOOKING WIDER, LOOKING DEEPER
It is crucial to appreciate the range of sources and knowledge bases
from which members draw in order to both motivate and legitimate
their involvement in the movement. This certainly allows a close
examination of the myths that some members hold, most often about
the distant racial. Other, but far more important is the process by which
those myths become connected to movement members' social realities.
Focusing only on the myths that are informed by the conservative
corporate media misses the other, more personal and more experiential,
forms of knowledge that organizers use to legitimate their wo rk in the
Tea Party.
Further, most of those myths and ideologies are present not just on the
right but are instead pervasive throughout our political and ideological
system in the contemporary United States. After all, as Vertigans has
pointed out, "The far-right is utilizing the popular history of America
that is disseminated within mainstream society" (2007:655). This is a

history, as we typically tell it, of individualism and white meritocracy
that is the hallmark of contemporary racism and value -rationality. This
color-blind racism is not only located in the far right or even solely
among conservatives. It has also been demonstrated among the left
(Hughey, 2012), including among pro-diversity liberals (see Burke,
2010, 2012). Therefore, to target the right exclusively is to miss the
pervasiveness of these beliefs throughout our political spectrum. We
need to look both more broadly and more deeply within our entire
social, and especially ideological, system.
The Tea Party is nothing more than the most recent manifestation of a
long-standing conservative politics that will continue to flourish as long
as their concerns are not addressed by an alternative framework. As
McGirr has noted, "By failing to take into account the deep -seated
conservative ideological traditions on which the Right drew and by
refusing to closely examine the ideological universe of conservatives,
liberal intellectuals underestimated the resilience and staying power of
the Right in American life" (2001:148). This is the unfinished busine ss
of progressives and the left in the United States. As Reese notes in her
study of welfare reform, "Although many working families within the
U.S. face many of the same challenges as welfare mothers—finding
decent jobs, obtaining health insurance, finding child care, and paying
their rent—anti-welfare propaganda and the targeted nature of U.S.
welfare programs have effectively divided these two groups" (2007:59).
To overcome this division, we must be able to grasp the full scope of
knowledge and meaning from which the right draws power.
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